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I 
INTRODUCTION 
In this empirical research project, we sought to explore the political 
feasibility of potential policy reforms to address the shortage of cadaveric 
organs for transplantation in America. We recruited 730 human subjects from 
an online population and assigned them to writing tasks that experimentally 
manipulated the salience of moral and posthumous risks. Subjects read ninety-
five-word descriptions of six proposed policy reforms, rating efficacy, morality, 
and overall support for each. We created weighted estimates of the overall 
potential support for each reform (WEOS), correcting for the skew in our study 
population to very roughly approximate the political affiliations of the 
American public. 
Our data suggest that cultural cognition and perceptions of risk do not drive 
policy choices about organ reform. Qualitatively, the writing tasks revealed 
some ambivalence about the risk of having life-saving organs harvested without 
consent, and they revealed tangible frustration about the risk of a loved one 
dying for lack of a needed organ. 
We found that Democrats were generally more supportive of reforms, 
whereas Independents were less supportive, and Republicans were middling in 
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their support. In particular, we found support for the proposal to make the 
deceased person’s own organ choices controlling and not deferential to next of 
kin (WEOS: 54%, with Democrat and Republican levels of support 
indistinguishable). Respondents did not see personal choice as particularly 
efficacious for resolving the shortage, but nonetheless morally important. In 
contrast, respondents perceived opt-out to be highly effective, but morally 
disconcerting. Nearly two-thirds of Democrats supported opt-out, and nearly 
half of Republicans did so—a significant difference. However, two-thirds of 
Independents were opposed, which drew the WEOS down to 46%. 
We found an even clearer, broad consensus that a regulated market for 
organs could be effective but would be deeply problematic morally (WEOS: 
16%, with no detectable political split). On the other hand, another incentive, 
the payment of vouchers for funeral expenses, enjoyed stronger support 
(WEOS: 51%, with a majority of both Democrats and Republicans supporting 
the proposal, but with the former even more so, given the 14% split). The 
voucher assuages moral objections about the market while maintaining 
apparent efficacy. 
Our study also suggests that a package of reforms—including reciprocal 
preferences, opt-out, and elimination of the family veto—may be feasible 
politically (WEOS: 53%, and no political split detectable). This package of 
reforms neutralizes moral objections to a reform based on reciprocal 
preferences alone (WEOS: 41%, with a significant 10% split along party lines). 
This study is best understood as a pilot for a future study with a 
demographically valid sample. Nonetheless, the richness of the data suggests 
that Americans make nuanced policy distinctions, which depend on how 
proposals are packaged. We identify certain reforms that may enjoy broad-
based support from across the political spectrum. 
II 
BACKGROUND 
The shortage of cadaveric organs for transplantation is well-known, and the 
philosophical, legal, and economic arguments about potential policy reforms 
have been well-aired for decades. Yet organ policy in the United States remains 
unchanged. The transplantation waiting lists grow, as do the numbers of those 
who die while waiting. 
Given the fractured political climate of 2014, the outlook for reform is grim. 
As Ronald Dworkin wrote only seven years ago, “We are no longer partners in 
self-government; our politics are rather a form of war.”1 Dworkin warned of an 
“unbridgeable gulf” where there may be “no common ground to be found and 
no genuine argument to be had.”2 It is, of course, an empirical question as to 
 
 1.  RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL 
DEBATE 1 (2006). 
 2.  Id.; see also Imer B. Flores, The Problem of Democracy in Contexts of Polarization 3–4 
(Georgetown Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research, Paper No. 13-017, 2013), available at 
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whether there may be common ground on the particular questions of organ-
transplantation policy. If any reform is to become actual policy in a democratic 
polity, it must reflect the political and cultural values of that polity, values that 
may not be subject to precise conceptual distinctions used by philosophers and 
lawyers. In this spirit, Dan Callahan has written that “[a] communitarian 
bioethics would be one that sought to blend cultural judgment and personal 
judgment.”3 
It is possible that the elite members of the academic intelligentsia and the 
medical-transplant professionals, who have until now led the debate about 
organ-transplantation policy, may have quite different political and cultural 
commitments than do members of the American public or their elected and 
appointed policymakers.4 Thus, for those serious about implementing life-saving 
organ-policy reforms in the real world—one soaked in politics and culture—the 
political and cultural feasibility of competing reforms demands closer study. In 
this article, we broach that topic empirically. 
According to a 2005 Gallup poll, Americans overwhelmingly support organ 
donation.5 Furthermore, about three-quarters of Americans polled said they are 
likely to have their organs donated upon death, and over half have actually 
registered as donors.6 Of course, personal willingness to donate and support for 
policy reform are distinct questions. As to the latter, one limitation of prior 
research is that it has failed to attend to the likelihood that competing potential 
reforms have divergent, or polarizing, cultural and political salience.7 
Opt-out systems (also known as presumed-consent or default-rule systems) 
have been used successfully in Europe,8 and they have been endorsed by many 
scholars in the United States.9 Yet Gallup reported that, as of 2005, Americans 
did not widely support reform predicated upon opting out or presumed 
 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2211018. 
 3.  Daniel Callahan, Bioethics: Private Choice and Common Good, 24 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 
28, 31 (1994). 
 4.  See Christopher F. Cardiff & Daniel B. Klein, Faculty Partisan Affiliations In All Disciplines: A 
Voter-Registration Study, 17 CRITICAL REV. 237, 239 (2005) (showing a five-to-one skew in philosophy 
departments); John O. McGinnis et al., The Patterns and Implications of Political Contributions by Elite 
Law School Faculty, 93 GEO. L.J. 1167, 1176 (2005) (showing a five-to-one skew among politically 
active law professors towards Democrats). 
 5.  THE GALLUP ORG., NATIONAL SURVEY OF ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION ATTITUDES 
AND BEHAVIORS 5 (2005). 
 6.  Id. Outside the United States, there is also a literature on attitudes towards organ 
transplantation. See, e.g., Catalina Conesa et al., Psychological Profile in Favor of Organ Donation, 35 
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1276 (2003). 
 7.  See Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of Nanotechnology, 4 
NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 87 (2009) [hereinafter Kahan et al., Nanotechnology]; see also Flores, 
supra note 2, at 13–16. 
 8.  Laura A. Siminoff & Mary Beth Mercer, Public Policy, Public Opinion, and Consent for 
Organ Donation, 10 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 377, 381 (2001). 
 9.  See, e.g., Michael B. Gill, Presumed Consent, Autonomy, and Organ Donation, 29 J. MED. & 
PHIL. 37 (2004). 
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consent.10 Less than half of the population supported such a reform.11 In a 2001 
study, Siminoff and Mercer also found that presumed consent was not viewed 
favorably among the 600 individuals they studied.12 The authors also listed 
objections to this system.13 One is that people who may have otherwise donated 
their organs will distrust medical authorities and opt not to donate, and another 
is that minorities—who are less likely to want to donate—would not be able to 
take the necessary steps to not donate.14 Such a system has not been 
implemented here, in part because it faces political opposition by some 
individualists, who view it as an instance of “big government,” intruding into 
the body conceived as a personal, rather than as a collective, resource. 
Alternatively, some have proposed incentive-based models, including 
payments of money or other material benefits for the giving of cadaveric organs 
(either in a regulated free market or in a more limited system, such as one that 
provides a voucher for funeral expenses). Gallup reports that less than one-fifth 
of Americans say that a financial incentive would increase their likelihood of 
donating their own or a family member’s organs.15 Siminoff and Mercer also 
found that about one-quarter of their study participants would be offended at a 
financial incentive to donate their family members’ organs upon death, one-
quarter would not be offended, and one-fifth would appreciate it.16 To some 
egalitarians, the thought of a financial incentive for organs may evoke the worst 
of capitalism, in which the human body is commoditized and the rich exploit the 
poor. A 2003 study by Mehmet and colleagues of surgeons and other 
transplantation professionals distinguished between “indirect” forms of 
compensation (such as payment of funeral expenses), which seventy percent of 
the study’s participants supported, and “direct” forms of compensation (for 
example, a tax credit or life-insurance benefit), which about as many within the 
study opposed.17 Thus, it appears that the framing and the details of the 
incentive scheme matter. 
The cultural significance of reciprocity-based models—like those tried in 
Israel18 and Singapore,19 in which registered organ donors receive priority access 
to available organs—are less obvious. Such proposals may be attractive to 
individualists who emphasize personal responsibility (because, in such a 
 
 10.  THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, supra note 5, at 20–21. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Siminoff & Mercer, supra note 8, at 382. 
 13.  Id. at 381. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, supra note 5, at 23–24. 
 16.  Siminoff & Mercer, supra note 8, at 382. 
 17.  Mehmet C. Oz et al., How to Improve Organ Donation: Results of the ISHLT/FACT Poll, 22 J. 
HEART & LUNG TRANSPLANTATION 389 (2003). 
 18.  See, e.g., Jacob Lavee & Avraham Stoler, Reciprocal Altruism—The Impact of Resurrecting an 
Old Moral Imperative on the National Organ Donation Rate in Israel, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 
3, 2014, at 323. 
 19.  See Alireza Bagheri, Organ Transplantation Laws in Asian Countries: A Comparative Study, 37 
TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 4159, 4160–61 (2005). 
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reciprocity-based system, the choice not to give has consequences). Haidt has 
argued that liberals and conservatives differ on their conceptions of fairness, 
with the former emphasizing notions of equality and the latter emphasizing 
“proportionality” (perhaps an Aristotelian notion of justice as desert).20 On this 
latter notion, reciprocity-based models might be more attractive to 
conservatives. Or perhaps liberals might also see them as attractive to the 
extent that all who join the social contract are treated equally. 
Finally, regardless of the policy regime, the ultimate question about 
transplantation might be decided by next-of-kin after death, and a law might 
resolve whether the family should have final “veto power” over the individual’s 
own choice or lack thereof. This policy also might have political and cultural 
valence, with individualists perhaps seeing the organ choice as personal, and 
communitarians seeing it as more familial. In the survey of transplantation 
professionals, most favored consulting the family unless the decedent had 
himself signed a donation card.21 
These policy choices implicitly raise questions about how to weigh relative 
risk, questions that have motivated scholars and might motivate the public and 
policymakers as well.22 On the one hand, there is the risk that someone might 
need an organ transplantation but fail to secure such a transplantation because 
of the severe shortage. On the other hand, there is the risk that someone might 
prefer not to have his or her cadaveric organs transplanted, but might 
nonetheless have his or her organs removed after death. It might be that 
individuals differently perceive the relative probability and severity of these 
risks in ways that inform their policy preferences. 
Kahan has found that cultural cognition can result in polarization about 
policy choices when individuals are given balanced information about a 
particular risk, even when individuals did not have any opinions about the topic 
before being asked about it.23 It is their “cultural predisposition toward risk” 
that leads individuals to “construe or assimilate information, whatever its 
provenance, in opposing ways that reinforce the risk perceptions they are 
predisposed to form. As a result, individuals end up in a state of cultural 
conflict—not over values, but over facts . . . .”24 Furthermore, individuals are 
more likely to recall information that supports their cultural worldview and are 
more likely to attribute credibility to experts they view as sharing their values.25 
Aside from cultural salience, each of these policy choices can be evaluated 
along multiple dimensions. One reform proposal might be highly effective in 
 
 20.  JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS 
AND RELIGION 161 (2013). 
 21.  Mehmet C. Oz et al., supra note 17, at 391. 
 22.  See, e.g., Gill, supra note 9, at 52–55. 
 23.  Kahan et al., Nanotechnology, supra note 7, at 88. 
 24.  Dan M. Kahan, Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of Risk, in 
HANDBOOK OF RISK THEORY 725, 746 (S. Roeser et al. eds., 2012). 
 25.  Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK RES. 147, 166–67 
(2011). 
4_ROBERTSON_YOKUM_WRIGHT_EIC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  4:01 PM 
106 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:101 
reducing the organ shortage, but deeply objectionable from a moral point of 
view. Another reform proposal might have the opposite profile. Still other 
reform proposals might shine in terms of both perceived efficacy and morality, 
but prove lacking in other aspects. Further, it remains to be seen whether 
people are more driven by efficacy or morality in making choices about organ-
transplantation reform. Of course, efficacy and morality overlap to the extent 
that reducing the organ shortage saves lives and reduces suffering, but there are 
also other moral concerns of autonomy and justice, which might function more 
like side constraints. 
We approached these questions empirically, using the cultural-cognition 
scale and measures of political identity to explore the heterogeneity of 
responses to each of these policy reform proposals. Through systematic 
experimental manipulation, we also tried to make the competing risks more 
salient for respondents. Finally, we teased apart efficacy, morality, and overall 
preferences for each policy reform, using separate questions. Aside from 
revealing which proposals enjoy the most support, this approach revealed 
whether some proposals might be more polarizing than others, a factor that 
might be important in settings governed by nonmajoritarian decision rules (such 
as the U.S. Senate).26 If the study reveals cultural heterogeneity in policy 
preferences, they may be mapped onto geographic variations across the United 
States, which might also suggest that a decentralized (federalist) approach to 
policy reform might be more effective than national efforts that might be 
stymied by a lack of cultural consensus favoring reform. 
We hypothesized that a hybrid policy-reform package—which includes 
elements of default rules, the social norm of reciprocity, and elimination of the 
post hoc family veto—might enjoy more political and cultural feasibility.27 This 
type of coherent hybrid of such policies might be more achievable than any one 
reform in isolation. 
III 
METHODS 
In this section we discuss our methods, including a description of the stimuli 
(the materials to which our participants responded) and the instrument (our 
means of recording those responses), along with the demographics of our 
participants. Other details appear in the appendix to this article. The appendix 
provides the text of our stimuli in particular. 
A. Stimulus and Instrument 
First, we collected demographic information (sex, ethnicity, year of birth, 
education, and zip code). In order to prepare the subjects for the task, and to 
 
 26.  See Delia Baldassarri & Peter Bearman, Dynamics of Political Polarization, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 
784, 801–04 (2007); Flores, supra note 2, at 9–10. 
 27.  See Christopher Tarver Robertson, From Free Riders to Fairness: A Cooperative System for 
Organ Transplantation, 48 JURIMETRICS 1, 26–40 (2007) (proposing one such hybrid proposal). 
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focus them upon the questions at hand, we presented all of them with a 286-
word passage that provided neutral background information about cadaveric 
organ-transplantation and the shortage of organs.28 
Next, subjects were randomized to one of three conditions (a three-by-one 
design) to make the competing risks of the organ-transplantation system more 
salient. In the “Need” condition, subjects were asked to imagine themselves in a 
situation in which someone they love needs an organ but is unable to get one, 
and to write about what they would experience and feel in that situation. In the 
“Taken” condition, subjects were asked to imagine themselves in a situation in 
which someone they love dies and has cadaveric organs harvested without his or 
her consent, and to write about what they would experience and feel in that 
situation. In the control condition, there was no writing task. 
Next, subjects were given instructions and then sequentially shown six pairs 
of organ policies in a within-subjects design. These sets of policies consisted of 
counterpoised descriptions of the status quo organ policy in the United States 
(first) versus a proposed reform (second). The policy sets each had a concise 
title describing the policy choice at issue: “Opt-In vs. Opt-Out,” “Family Choice 
vs. Personal Choice,” “Altruistic Donations vs. Regulated Market,” 
“Voluntarism Alone vs. Funeral Vouchers,” “Open Eligibility vs. Reciprocal 
Preference,” and “Current Package vs. Reform Package.” We designed the 
policy descriptions to minimize jargon and complex language, to be neutral in 
valence, and to be consistent in tone and length (each approximated ninety-five 
words). We pilot-tested the policies with a class of law students and 
undergraduate students to assess  the policies’ clarity, as well as the potential 
for bias, and we made revisions. The first five sets of policies consisted of 
individual policy reforms and were shown in random order. The sixth policy 
pair consisted of a package of reforms, consisting of three of the individual 
reforms previously considered (opt-out, personal choice, and reciprocal 
preference). Each pair of policies was shown on a separate page, followed by 
three questions about each, and participants were not allowed to go back to 
previous policies. 
Below each policy pair, we asked the following three questions. First, 
“Which system will produce more organs for transplantation?” We coded this 
answer as “efficacy.” Second, “Which system is more acceptable from a moral 
point of view?” We coded this answer as “morality.” Third, “Overall, which 
system do you prefer?” We coded this answer as “overall preference.” 
Respondents answered each question on a bidirectional nine-point Likert scale 
(shown in the appendix) with each anchor naming the alternatives (for example, 
opt-in and opt-out). 
After answering for each of the six policy sets, we administered the cultural-
cognition scale (short version), including a second attention check therein. We 
asked about political affiliation on a six-level scale (ranging from strong 
 
 28.  See infra Methodological Appendix. 
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democrat to strong republican, with two leaning independent levels in the 
middle), which we collapsed to three levels for analyses. Finally, subjects were 
allowed to provide open-ended responses concerning “any thoughts or 
comments about organ donation policy in the United States,” if they chose to 
do so. 
B. Participants and Randomization 
We applied for and received “exempt” approval by the Human Subjects 
Protection Program at the University of Arizona. Inclusion criteria required 
that subjects be within the United States geographically, over the age of 
eighteen, and able to read and write English. We focused on those within the 
United States because we were particularly interested in reforms that could be 
politically and culturally feasible for that particular polity. The study makes no 
claim to universality.29 
We conducted the study online, recruiting human subjects from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (Mturk).30 Our final dataset for analysis included 730 
responses.31 As shown in table 1, our study population was similar to the 
demographics of the United States census in terms of gender. However, it did 
not include many subjects who lack a high school diploma or GED. Our sample 
also severely underrepresents those over the age of sixty. It also consisted of a 
somewhat larger proportion of whites than the national population. 
Randomization succeeded in distributing subjects across conditions. 
Regression analyses (not shown) found that these demographic factors are not 
significantly correlated with our dependent variables, so we proceed with 
discussions of central tendencies and proportions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29.  See Jeffrey J. Arnett, The Neglected 95%: Why American Psychology Needs to Become Less 
American, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 602, 607–09 (2008); Joseph Henrich et al., The Weirdest People in the 
World?, 33 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 61, 63 (2010). 
 30.  Mturk, a human-subject population associated with Amazon.com, is increasingly utilized for 
social science research. See Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental 
Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 351 (2012); Gabriele Paolacci et al., 
Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 411 
(2010); Danielle N. Shapiro et al., Using Mechanical Turk to Study Clinical Populations, 1 CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 213, 213 (2012). 
 31.  Recruitment and data cleaning procedures are described in the Methodological Appendix. 
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Table 1: Demographic Data by Experimental Condition and Compared to U.S. 
Census32 
Legend: Frequency (Percentage)  
 
 Control 
(n = 282) 
Need 
Prime 
(n = 214) 
Taken 
Prime 
(n = 234) 
Total 
Subjects 
(N = 730) 
U.S. 
Census33 
Education 
< HS Diploma or GED 1 (0%) 1 (0%) 1 (0%) 3 (0%) 15% 
HS Diploma or GED 34 (12%) 15 (7%) 26 (11%) 75 (10%) 30% 
Some College or Assoc. 100 (35%) 100 (47%) 80 (34%) 280 (38%) 28% 
College Grad 112 (39%) 74 (35%) 89 (38%) 275 (38%) 18% 
Graduate Degree 35 (12%) 24 (11%) 38 (16%) 97 (13%) 9% 
      
Gender      
Male 141 (50%) 98 (46%) 107 (46%) 346 (47%) 49% 
Female 141 (50%) 116 (54%) 127 (54%) 384 (53%) 51% 
      
Age Groups      
18–24 54 (19%) 34 (16%) 40 (17%) 128 (18%) 13% 
25–34 115 (41%) 86 (40%) 89 (38%) 290 (40%) 18% 
35–44 50 (18%) 46 (22%) 42 (18%) 138 (19%) 19% 
45–59 45 (16%) 37 (17%) 47 (20%) 129 (18%) 27% 
60+ 18 (6%) 11 (5%) 16 (9%) 45 (6%) 23% 
      
Race      
White 239 (85%) 183 (86%) 203 (87%) 625 (86%) 74% 
Nonwhite 43 (15%) 31 (14%) 31 (13%) 105 (14%) 26% 
     Pew Political Affiliation34     
Democrat 
Independent 
Republican 
111 (39%) 
134 (48%) 
37 (13%) 
74 (35%) 
109 (51%) 
31 (15%) 
79 (33%) 
122 (52%) 
33 (14%) 
264 (36%) 
365 (50%) 
101 (14%) 
31% 
39% 
24% 
 
IV 
RESULTS 
We provide specifics and analyses below, distinguishing by the respondents’ 
 
      32. Due to rounding, sets of percentages might not add to one-hundred percent. 
      33. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2012), available 
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2012/tables.html. 
      34. Pew political distribution in taken from a national phone survey conducted April 4, 2012 in 
which five percent of the respondents indicated “don’t know” or “no preference,” options that were not 
available in our online instrument. THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, 
TRENDS IN AMERICAN VALUES: 1987–2012, PARTISAN POLARIZATION SURGES IN BUSH, OBAMA 
YEARS 141 (2012) [hereinafter PEW, AMERICAN VALUES], availabe at http://www.people-
press.org/files/legacy-pdf/06-04-12%20Values%20Release.pdf . Political affiliations from our study are 
collapsed from six-level scale used in the instrument to three levels, to be comparable to the Pew 
results. 
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perceptions of efficacy, morality, and overall preference, and splitting the 
respondents by political affiliations. In short, our data suggest that cultural 
cognition and perceptions of risk do not drive policy choices about organ 
reform. Qualitatively, the writing tasks revealed some ambivalence about the 
risk of having life-saving organs harvested without consent and revealed 
tangible frustration about the risk of a loved one dying for lack of a needed 
organ. Quantitatively, we found that Democrats were generally more 
supportive of reforms, while Independents were less supportive, and 
Republicans were middling in their support. Across the various reform 
proposals, we found strengths and weaknesses, but we found broad consensus 
that a regulated market for organs could be effective but would be deeply 
problematic morally. On the other hand, another incentive, the payment of 
vouchers for funeral expenses, enjoyed stronger support, as it assuages moral 
objections. We found that a package of reforms—including reciprocal 
preferences, opt-out, and elimination of the family veto—may be feasible 
politically. This package of reforms neutralizes moral objections to a reform 
based on reciprocal preferences alone. 
A. Efficacy, Morality, and Overall Preferences for Reforms 
Respondents evaluated each proposed reform in terms of its efficacy in 
increasing the number of organs available for transplantation, its morality, and 
its overall attractiveness. These results are compiled in table 2. Figure 1 plots 
probability-density estimates, which are essentially smoothed histograms. We 
found that respondents did make such distinctions, sometimes making 
diametrically opposite evaluations as to morality and efficacy, with overall 
support sometimes tracking efficacy (for the opt-out) and sometimes tracking 
morality (for the regulated market). 
Overall, we found the greatest support for removing the “family veto” (a 
term not used in the stimulus) and instead for enforcing the deceased person’s 
personal organ choice. As one participant stated in an open-ended response, 
“Personal choice is a must regarding the donation of organs.”  Also enjoying 
strong support were the “funeral recognition” proposal to create a voucher to 
pay for the deceased organ donor’s burial expenses, and the proposal to move 
towards an opt-out system, where organ sharing would become the default rule. 
All three of these policy proposals scored medians of seven on the nine-point 
scale for overall preferences. 
In contrast, the proposal to use financial incentives more directly, by moving 
towards a regulated market for organs, was the least attractive, with a median of 
three on the overall preference scale. It is informative that the two methods of 
financial incentives—regulated market and funeral vouchers—had diametrically 
opposite evaluations. 
In terms of efficacy, on the median, respondents thought that all of the 
proposed reforms would tend towards increasing the supply of organs for 
transplantation compared to the status quo (medians greater than five), except 
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for the elimination of the family veto, in which respondents were evenly split as 
to efficacy. The move to an opt-out system and creation of a funeral-voucher 
system were thought to be most efficacious (medians of nine and eight 
respectively). Regarding the optional open-ended questions at the end of the 
survey, the dominant response was that the best policy change would be to an 
opt-out system. Two typical responses are as follows: 
I think everything should remain the same except the opt-in/opt-out feature. I think all 
too often people forget to sign up to be an organ donor but would like to. Having the 
opt-out feature, the people that are passionate about NOT donating will be more 
willing to fill out the paperwork required to keep their organs. If someone has a 
reason they don’t want to donate their organs, they will make sure they are signed up 
to avoid donation because it will actually be important to them. 
I’m personally not signed up, and to be honest, I think Opt-Out is definitely the way it 
should be. A lot of people probably don’t ever Opt-In because it’s simply . . . nothing 
that ever crosses their mind! 
In terms of moral evaluation, respondents reported greater variation across 
proposals. The creation of a regulated market for organs was viewed as most 
problematic from a moral perspective (median of two), followed by the granting 
of reciprocal preferences for those giving and receiving organs (median of 
three). As one respondent wrote regarding reciprocal preferences, 
I do not think that the reciprocal preference is [sic] a good idea. As was mentioned 
earlier, most people just never think to make the decision of whether they want to be 
an organ donor. Just because someone is not already registered does not mean they 
are unwilling to be. Giving preference to registered organ donors is grossly unfair 
when it is a matter of life and death. 
And another stated, “It’d feel ‘icky’ to deny non–organ donors a transplant, 
or rather, put them further down the list, because of their choice.” 
The median respondent scored a five, thereby expressing no moral 
preference between, on the on hand, the opt-out and funeral-voucher proposals, 
and, on the other hand, the corresponding elements of the status quo. The 
median respondent was more supportive of the morality of reforming the status 
quo by enforcing individual choices, rather than choices of next-of-kin (median 
of seven). 
Synthesizing these results, one can see that the regulated-market proposal 
was perplexing for respondents. It was viewed as one of the most efficacious 
(median of seven) but least moral (median of two) solutions. The respondents’ 
overall evaluation of the regulated-market proposal (median of three) tracked 
more closely to respondents’ moral positions than to their perceptions of 
efficacy. Comparing the market to the funeral-vouchers proposal (both on the 
middle row of figure 1), we were interested to find that the two methods 
utilizing financial incentives had diametrically opposite evaluations. As we tease 
morality concerns (the light dotted line) apart from efficacy concerns (the dark 
dotted line), we find that, although the modal respondent has deep moral 
objections to the market proposal, he or she is ambivalent about the voucher 
program, perhaps because the voucher program does not raise such severe 
concerns about commodification and equity. As for efficacy concerns in 
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isolation, the subjects concede the efficacy of both the market and the voucher 
solutions, although they view the voucher as even more effective, perhaps 
because they view the crowding-out problem as neutralized. The 
aforementioned moral gap between the voucher and market proposal is enough 
to lead to different overall evaluations (bold solid line) of each. 
The reciprocal-preferences proposal also had opposite valences with regard 
to efficacy (median of seven) versus morality (median of three). However, for 
this proposal, the overall evaluations tracked more closely with the efficacy 
score, and it enjoyed an overall positive valence of support (median of six). 
We also assessed a particular package of reforms, which included reciprocal 
preference, opt-out, and personal choice. This package proposal was perceived 
as being highly effective (median of eight), morally neutral (median of five), 
and overall rather positive (median of seven). The package itself, when 
evaluated alongside its component reforms by comparing its efficacy, morality, 
and efficacy means to the mean of the individual reforms’ means (not shown in 
Table 2) was viewed as somewhat more efficacious (mean of 7.01 compared to 
6.51), slightly less moral (mean of 4.74 compared to 5.07), and slightly better 
overall (mean of 5.93 compared to 5.79). As one respondent wrote of the 
reform package, 
Overall, I think the best package would be the one you proposed, with opt-
out, personal choice, and reciprocating. I don’t think that anyone, such as 
businesses, should be able to profit by selling organs, but I do think it’s fair to 
give priority to those who are willing to give organs themselves. And this choice 
should never involve[] the family’s wishes unless the patient who passes hasn’t 
specified (even though I’d still prefer the opt-out option to family’s making the 
decisions). 
Notably, the reciprocal-preferences proposal suffered from a negative moral 
evaluation, compared to “open eligibility.” But when that reform was paired 
with opt-out and with personal choice, the moral valence shifted toward 
neutrality. This finding illustrates the possibility that a packaging of reforms 
might in some ways rectify the problems perceived with individual parts. In 
other words, the package was not judged by its weakest link. 
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Table 2: Efficacy, Morality, and Overall Evaluation of Reforms in Control 
Condition 
 
criterion mean sd median se 
Altruistic donations vs. regulated market 
Efficacy 5.94 2.68 7 0.16 
Morality 2.67 2.12 2 0.13 
Overall 3.48 2.62 3 0.16 
Family choice vs. personal choice 
Efficacy 5.29 2.69 5 0.16 
Morality 6.78 2.2 7 0.13 
Overall 6.31 2.78 7 0.17 
Open eligibility vs. reciprocal preference 
Efficacy 6.53 2.65 7 0.16 
Morality 4.04 2.68 3 0.16 
Overall 5.16 2.97 6 0.18 
Opt-in vs. opt-out 
Efficacy 7.71 2.21 9 0.13 
Morality 4.4 2.39 5 0.14 
Overall 5.9 2.98 7 0.18 
Voluntarism alone vs. funeral recognition 
Efficacy 7.3 1.99 8 0.12 
Morality 4.64 2.32 5 0.14 
Overall 6.21 2.66 7 0.16 
Current package vs. new package 
Efficacy 7.01 2.15 8 0.13 
Morality 4.74 2.28 5 0.14 
Overall 5.93 2.72 7 0.16 
Legend: n = 282. Scores were on nine-point bidirectional scales, 
with higher scores (above 5.0) indicating support for the policy 
reform (always listed second in the pairing, with the status quo 
listed first). 
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Figure 1: Probability-Density Plots of Overall Preferences in Policy Choice 
Pairs, with Perceptions of Efficacy and Morality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: n = 730. All subjects are plotted. 
B. Variation by Political Affiliations and Cultural Cognition 
Individuals’ self-reported political affiliations were correlated with their 
organ-policy preferences, but respondents were not strongly polarized along 
political lines. And there are many instances of consensus. 
Political affiliation was measured on a six-level scale, from strong Democrat 
to strong Republican, with two levels of leaning independents in the middle. 
For purposes of figure 2, these six levels are collapsed to three levels to reflect a 
simplified political valence, and the nine-level scale measuring support for one 
of the policies versus the other is collapsed into a binary choice of support 
Efficacy Morality  Overall Preference 
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versus not-support. We coded those in the middle level of five as not supporting 
the reform, which makes the apparent levels of support lower than they 
otherwise might be (about ten to fifteen percent of respondents were in this 
middle position). 
This analysis reveals that the political affiliations might be associated with 
differences of opinion on organ policy, with Democrats tending to favor the 
proposed reforms more often, with independents less motivated for reform 
overall, and with Republicans in the middle. Compared to Republicans, 
Democrats were particularly strong in their relative support for three reforms: 
opt-out (a sixteen-percent gap, p = 0.01), funeral recognition (a fourteen-
percent gap, p = 0.02), and reciprocal preference (a ten-percent gap, p = 0.05). 
Interestingly, the funeral-recognition proposal—a type of financial incentive—
enjoys more support from Democrats than Republicans, while the more direct 
proposal for a regulated market trends in the opposite direction. 
Although Republicans are often associated with free-market reforms, we 
find less than five percent of them scoring the regulated-market reform as 
having the strongest level of support (nine), a rate that is indistinguishable from 
the Democrats in the sample. Democrats and Republicans alike favored staying 
with the altruistic system of the status quo compared with the free-market 
reform option. 
As shown in figure 2, we also created weighted estimates of overall support 
for each reform proposal, which correct for the political skew in our study 
population by weighting according to the Pew’s recent measurement of the 
national distribution of Democrats, Republicans, and independents35, and 
thereby roughly simulate the potential level of support from the American 
public. In comparison, we observed that the Mturk population exhibits a 
leftward skew, with 2.3 times as many subjects identifying as Democrats 
(including strong Democrat, Democrat, or independent lean Democrat such 
that n = 512), compared to those identifying as Republicans (including all three 
levels such that n = 218). Although this reweighting does not dramatically 
change our raw estimates (a difference of two percentage points at the 
maximum), it still requires a particular note of caution. It is likely that our 
Republicans might still be unlike the broader American population of 
Republicans in ways that are not observable in our sample (and likewise for the 
independents and Democrats). As we emphasize further in the limitations 
section below, our study is no substitute for a demographically valid survey of 
the American population. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35.  PEW, AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 34, at 147; see supra Table 1. 
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 Figure 236 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The cultural-cognition framework also provided insight on our data, though 
the effects were few and small. Building from the work of Widvalsky and 
Douglas on the one hand and Dake on the other, Kahan has created reliable 
attitudinal scales meant to measure the extent to which a person is hierarchical 
or egalitarian and to measure the extent to which a person is an individualist or 
a communitarian.37 Individualism refers to a weak orientation toward group life, 
whereas communitarian refers to a strong orientation to group life.38 
Hierarchical refers to a strong social stratification on the basis of status 
characteristics, whereas egalitarianism refers to a weak social stratification on 
 
     36. Legend: Sorted by overall weighted support, 95% confidence intervals shown. Support for 
reform is based on top four levels of nine-point scale; an additional 10%–15% were neutral. Each 
political affiliation shown here consists of two levels on the six-level scale. Compared to Republicans, 
Democrats were stronger in their support for three reforms: opt-out (a 16% gap, p = 0.01), funeral 
recognition (a 14% gap, p = 0.02), and reciprocal preference (a 10% gap, p = 0.05). 
 37.  Kahan et al., Nanotechnology, supra note 7, at 87; see MARY DOUGLAS & ADAM 
WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 121–22 (1982); Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of 
Risk: An Analysis of Contemporary Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. CROSS-CULTURAL 
PSYCHOL. 61, 62 (1991). 
 38.  Kahan et al., Nanotechnology, supra note 7, at 87. 
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the basis of status characteristics.39 
We predicted that respondents would be polarized depending on their 
cultural preferences. We did find differences in opinions for two of the policy 
proposals, namely, opt-out and regulated market. In particular, hierarchical–
individualists were about half as likely to overall prefer the opt-out reform as 
were egalitarian–communitarians (p < 0.001). Egalitarians tended to support 
the reform towards opt-out, regardless of whether they were communitarians or 
individualists. 
Additionally, egalitarian–communitarians were significantly more likely 
than all other cultural-cognition groups to perceive a market for organ 
transplantation as morally objectionable (p < 0.01). They were also less likely 
overall to prefer the reform compared to hierarchical–communitarians (p < 
0.05) and hierarchical individualists (p < 0.01). Of the egalitarian–
communitarians, nearly thirty percent indicated the strongest preference 
possible for maintaining the status quo of altruistic donations. However, it bears 
emphasis that all four cultural-cognition types were generally opposed to the 
regulated-market proposal. 
C. Responses to Manipulated Risk-Salience Writing Tasks 
As explained in our Methods section, we randomly assigned subjects to one 
of three different experimental conditions, in which we sought to manipulate 
the salience of the competing perceptions of risk concerning organ-
transplantation policy.40 Prior research has shown that these sorts of writing 
tasks can increase the salience of emotional and other contextual factors in 
decision making. For example, Tiedens and Linton demonstrated an effectual 
priming of emotional states,41 and Kvaran, Nichols, and Sanfey primed an 
analytic mode of thought.42 Also, Sieck and Yayes demonstrated that exposition 
reduces the framing effect (a heuristic for decision making).43 
In our study, the writing tasks had the effect of increasing attrition in the 
two treatment conditions. This raised a concern that self-selection might defeat 
 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  See discussion supra Part II.A. In the “Need” condition, subjects performed a writing task in 
which they imagined that someone that they loved desperately needed an organ transplantation, but 
did not receive one due to the severe organ shortage. In the “Taken” condition, subjects performed a 
writing task in which they imagined that someone they loved had a strong preference to be buried with 
his or her body intact, but instead died and had his or her cadaveric organs removed against his or her 
will. In the control condition, there was no writing task. 
 41.  Larissa Z. Tiedens & Susan Linton, Judgment Under Emotional Certainty and Uncertainty: The 
Effects of Specific Emotions on Information Processing, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 973, 
983–85 (2001). 
 42.  Trevor Kvaran, Shaun Nichols & Alan Sanfey, The Effect of Analytic and Experiential Modes 
of Thought on Moral Judgment, in PROGRESS IN BRAIN RESEARCH 187, 192–94 (V.S. Chandrasekhar 
Pammi & Narayanan Srinivasan eds., 2013). 
 43.  Winston Sieck & J. Frank Yates, Exposition Effects on Decision Making: Choice and 
Confidence in Choice, 70 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 207, 214–18 
(1997). 
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our random assignment (that assignment being our ‘intention to treat’). On our 
dependent variables, however, we found few important effects across 
experimental conditions. In eighteen logistic regressions (for three dependent 
variables of efficacy, morality, and overall support for all six policies), we found 
only two significant (p < .05) effects of experimental condition, each pertaining 
to the reform package: The taken prime increases the likelihood of perceiving 
the reform package as efficacious (  = .49; odds ratio = 1.63), while the need 
prime increases the likelihood of perceiving the reform package as morally 
acceptable (  = .40; odds ratio = 1.49).44 These findings might be artifacts of 
having made so many statistical comparisons.45 
Although the writing tasks did not seem to impact the respondents’ support 
for various policy reforms, the responses themselves yield interesting insights 
about how people think about the competing risks of dying for lack of an organ 
versus having an organ harvested without consent. We used an inductive coding 
methodology to analyze qualitatively the responses provided by subjects in each 
experimental condition (“need” vs. “taken”). Overall, we found that the need 
condition evoked feelings of sadness, devastation, and hopelessness, along with 
both blame and resentment of those who decline to transplant organs along 
with the system that produces a shortage. Overall, although some people felt 
very angry about the nonconsensual harvesting, we found that the dominant 
response in the taken condition was one of ambivalence. The excerpts exhibited 
below have been edited for length and style. 
D. Need Condition 
Asking people to imagine that a loved one is suffering from liver failure and 
needs a transplant in order to live, but is unable to get one in time, resulted in 
highly emotional responses from participants. In fact, one participant stated 
that the exercise was “relatively taxing for the amount to be paid” because the 
imagination task required them to actually feel sad. Words like “devastating,” 
“heartbreaking,” “angry,” “helpless,” and “hopeless” dominated the responses. 
The following response is paradigmatic. 
I would feel completely grief-stricken. I would already begin to feel the loss of my 
loved one even though they are still alive. I would feel hopeless and morose, cursing 
the unfairness of life, irrationally jealous and angry at other people who have received 
 
 44.  One potential explanation for our null results is that our experimental manipulation might 
have worn off as respondents proceeded through the six policy-reform choices. Although the individual 
polices were presented in random order, the reform package was always presented last. Because 
significant differences were only observed in the package, the wear-off hypothesis is not supported. 
 45.  We also expected that our experimental manipulations would cause the cultural relevance of 
the organ shortage and potential reform proposals to become more pronounced and perhaps thereby 
increase polarization on the cultural-cognition scale. This hypothesis was not strongly supported, 
though some effect was observed. The “Taken” prime—which raised concerns about organs being 
removed without consent—made no difference for the hierarchical individualists, but made the 
egalitarian–individualists much more supportive of the opt-in reform. Those respondents apparently 
realized that the risk of having organs removed after death was really not a concern worth having, and 
thus increased their resolve towards an opt-out system. 
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liver transplants in time. 
Many participants highlighted their frustration with the organ shortage, 
argued that more people should donate their organs, and offered suggestions 
about how to increase organ donation. Ironically, some of these participants 
were not themselves organ donors, but stated that thinking about this situation 
made them seriously consider becoming an organ donor. 
The strong negative emotions felt by participants in reaction to the writing 
prompt also led some of them to blame nondonors’ beliefs for the organ 
shortage. One participant called beliefs against organ donation “superstitious 
nonsense.” Others noted that people are misinformed about organ donation 
and mistakenly believe that doctors will let them die so their organs can be 
transplanted to someone else.46 
Surely, enough people die all the time to provide adequate organs to those who need 
them. I suspect that the reason that more organs are not available is because many 
people have bizarre religious beliefs which make them unnaturally attached to the 
dead bodies of their friends and families. 
Regardless of whether nondonors’ beliefs were attacked, often participants 
felt resentful of nondonors and attacked their decision not to donate. These 
critiques were often about how organs were of no use to the dead and would be 
better off helping the living. As one participant put it, “Not to be crude but 
people die every day and there have to be thousands of usable organs 
essentially being thrown away.” 
However, not everyone was angry at nondonors. For some, the primary 
focus of their distress was the suffering and pending death of their loved one. 
Most distressing to me is the fact that she suffers each moment that she has to wait, 
due to the pain and stress on her body. I am not angry at “the system” per se, as anger 
in this case is pointless and that I am a faithful person and don’t really measure 
everything in terms of what the world owes me or anyone I love. I am praying every 
chance I get now, with a faith that something good will come from this situation. 
Other participants targeted American society and culture more broadly in 
their emotionally laden responses. 
I would think that . . . the United States, which proclaims itself to be the best place in 
the world, wouldn’t allow this to happen to anybody. After being grief stricken, I 
would feel enraged. Enraged that after all the taxes we pay, as an American, that this 
can’t be resolved. 
Some participants blamed healthcare providers and scientists for not being 
able to prevent the tragedy they were asked to imagine. Others suspected that 
persons with wealth, fame, or other forms of privilege have a greater chance of 
receiving an organ than the average person. When discussing the problem of 
organ shortages, one participant noted, “[t]here are ways to exploit the waiting 
list (typically money or political power) to bump your name closer to the top of 
the list. In my family’s case, that would mean life and death.” Another stated 
that, “It would be frustrating that people who were financially better-off would 
have more access to treatments than my friend would.” 
 
 46.  This is a distinct form of risk that could be explored in future experimental manipulations. 
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Although the majority of responses to the prompt focused on the grief 
participants would feel in the imagined situation, some participants were 
reflective about the perversity of wishing for an available organ. They noted 
that an available organ would mean that someone else had to die, and that 
another family was feeling what they were feeling. They still hoped for an 
organ, however, but would feel sad, ashamed, or guilty if their loved one 
received one. Another common response to the writing prompt was for 
participants to become task-oriented and to focus less on what they would feel 
and more on what they would do in the situation. Although some participants 
said they would do everything they legally could to obtain a liver for their dying 
loved one, some admitted they would look on the black market for a liver. 
A minority of participants responded that they would be at peace with the 
fact that their loved one was dying. Some argued that death was natural and 
that life should not be prolonged in the case of organ failure. Others made 
statements emphasizing that it was not “really anyone’s duty to die so that 
someone I know can live.” Others said it was up to God to determine when it is 
time for a person to die; thus they expressed neither anger toward non-donors 
nor frustration with the lack of available organs. 
Several subjects suggested increasing public awareness of and discussion 
about the problem of organ shortage. The following are some of their 
suggestions for increasing awareness: public service announcements 
encouraging organ donation and emphasizing how donation helps others, “large 
informational media campaigns” explaining various reform proposals, “heavy 
marketing campaigns” meant to make altruism popular, and information for  
people on how to become donors. Of course, these are the core features of the 
status quo, which have so far proven insufficient.47 Others focused on educating 
individuals about organ donation through the public-school system and allowing 
students the opportunity to register as donors in school. These participants also 
argued that engaging in a discussion about organ donation in an educational 
setting would mitigate the negative effects of the “sensationalized stories of 
people killed in Brazil for their organs.” 
E. Taken Condition 
Participants had a range of responses to the writing prompt that asked them 
to imagine that their loved one’s organs were transplanted upon death, despite 
their loved ones’ strong wishes not to be an organ donor, but that the 
transplantation saved the life of another. 
The dominant response was one of feeling ambivalent. Many participants 
noted that, on the one hand, they were upset that their loved one’s wishes that 
their body be buried in its entirety were not followed. On the other hand, many 
stated that they would eventually come to peace with what had happened 
 
 47.  Amitai Etzioni, Organ Donation: A Communitarian Approach, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 
1, 6–14 (2003). 
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because another’s life was saved. Participants often used the phrases “feel 
conflicted” or “have mixed feelings” in order to express their reaction. 
If this happened to someone very close to me, I would feel conflicted. On one hand, I 
would be saddened and disturbed that the wishes of this person were not 
recognized . . . . On the other hand, I would be happy and delighted for the person 
whose life was saved. I would be able to take solace in the fact that someone was 
helped. 
Still, another common response to this situation was anger or even outrage 
that a loved one’s body had been violated. As one participant put it, “That is a 
total disrespect toward the family just going in there acting like it’s the pick n 
pull and a car junk yard and grabbing whatever part you need for the next car. 
We are talking about a human being here.” Many used the words “outraged,” 
“furious,” “very upset,” or “appalled.” 
Some participants framed their outrage in religious terms, while others 
framed their objections in terms of improper medical practice and theft of 
organs. Many reported a desire to sue the hospital. 
God gave these organs to my loved one at birth and he should have “gone home” with 
these organs intact. Government and family members do not have the right to make a 
decision as serious as this when my loved one was adamant about his beliefs. 
Some participants stated that they would never trust doctors again. As one 
participant noted, “Over time I think I would come to my senses and would be 
happy for the lady whose life was saved with the donation. Still I would always 
be distrusting the medical system and feel like they had taken advantage of 
me.” Another compared it to a case they had heard about where dead bodies 
were “pillaged”: 
I would be aghast, and even appalled, that I w[as] not consulted about having her 
organs removed before it was done. It would remind me of the horrific case in New 
York/Philadelphia where dead bodies were pillaged for bone, skin, etc. without the 
family’s consent. 
A subset of participants, although acknowledging that a wrong had 
occurred—one which should be prevented if at all possible—were stoic about 
the problem. 
I would not be at all upset about the event that just happened to my loved one if it was 
truly due to a miscommunication or an erroneous authorization. I do realize that in 
the confusing minutes surrounding an unexpected death, it is not always possible to 
verify every fact . . . however, perhaps new procedures should be put in place to 
prevent this from happening in the future. 
The third common response was that the participant would not be upset at 
all because their loved one was dead, would no longer need their body, and 
something good had come from the situation. The following example is 
representative of the prompts in this category. 
I know she asked to be buried with all parts of her body, but I fail to see the downsides 
of letting her organs be available for use. If she could witness what a blessing her 
organs were—as grim as it sounds—she wouldn’t have any reservations about them 
being used to help others. 
In fact, one participant even argued, “People shouldn’t get a choice how 
their body parts are handled because they don’t need them anymore. It’s pretty 
4_ROBERTSON_YOKUM_WRIGHT_EIC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  4:01 PM 
122 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:101 
selfish.” 
A subset of participants felt happy that the organs had been transplanted, 
even if they would have followed their loved one’s wishes had they been given 
the choice. 
It may not be what my friend wished during his life, and I wouldn’t have chosen to act 
against his wishes, but things worked out for the best . . . . A person’s life was saved 
and she is no longer suffering. It seems as though it was meant to be. . . . I would 
accept this outcome peacefully and joyfully. 
Some participants did not directly engage with the imaginative aspect of the 
prompt, but instead engaged in a philosophical discussion about the ethics of 
forced organ donation. 
I am adamantly opposed to any forced organ donations and accidental donations are a 
step down the slippery slope. I have known a number of good people that have died 
awaiting organs and [I] am aware of a number of wealthy slime that have cut the line 
to be “rescued” numerous times (think Dick Cheney). We don’t want to be living on 
some organ farm for the privileged. 
Respondents in this category often referenced a “slippery slope”—that is, an 
“accidental” organ donation could turn into forced organ donations. 
V 
LIMITATIONS 
Our study was limited in several ways. First, it bears emphasis that this study 
merely explored perceptions and preferences with regard to organ-
transplantation reform. This method is descriptive, not prescriptive. It does not 
purport to say what would actually be the most efficacious, most moral, or most 
overall preferable reform to organ-transplantation policy. 
Second, our use of Mturk as a source of human subjects prevents us from 
making direct claims about the policy preferences of the American public as 
such.48 Nonetheless, our sample is significantly more heterogeneous and 
representative than the undergraduate psychology students that are frequently 
used for social-science research.49 Our weighted estimates more closely simulate 
the potential views of the American public, given their political identifications. 
Still, we cannot say whether the Republicans in our sample are similar to the 
Republicans nationwide (and likewise for Democrats and independents), and 
thus our study is no substitute for a national survey with a demographically 
valid sample. 
A third limitation of our study concerns the way in which we presented the 
policy-reform choices. On the one hand, we did not present comprehensive 
analyses of each policy proposition, which could have included extensive 
evidence and arguments from advocates on both sides of the issue. That sort of 
 
 48.  See Berinsky et al., supra note 30, at 361; Paolacci et al., supra note 30, at 412–13; Shapiro et 
al., supra note 30, at 215–16. 
 49.  Psychology undergraduates are used as subjects in two-thirds of the studies published by the 
premier journal in the social-psychology field. Arnett, supra note 29, at 604; Henrich et al., supra note 
29, at 63. 
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extensive briefing, along with the potential for discourse and deliberation, 
would have been required for truly informed choices.50 On the other hand, we 
did not elicit raw preferences from subjects, which would have better avoided 
any potential for the researchers biasing the results. Instead, we struck a 
balance between these poles by offering a general background of the organ 
shortage, and approximately 200-word explanations of each set of policy 
choices. The context of these choices might be comparable to the degree of 
information that a citizen gets from a newscast describing a proposed reform. It 
thus might have some relevance to real-world opinion formation. 
Still, it should be emphasized that this experiment tested opinions about 
particular descriptions of policy reforms, rather than testing opinions about the 
policy reforms themselves. It is likely that different formulations of these ideas 
would yield different responses and that their political salience could refined or 
otherwise manipulated by political actors.51 
VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
Let us return to Ronald Dworkin’s challenge that began the article: 
Democracy can be healthy with no serious political argument if there is nevertheless a 
broad consensus about what is to be done. It can be healthy even if there is no 
consensus if it does have a culture of argument. But it cannot remain healthy with 
deep and bitter divisions and no real argument, because it then becomes only a 
tyranny of numbers.52 
Our data provides some hope for reaching consensus on organ-policy 
reform. The data suggest that the issues of organ-transplantation policy might 
not be as politically or culturally polarizing as one might suppose. Further, we 
found that relative perceptions of mortal or posthumous risk do not drive policy 
choices to a large extent.53 Our experimental manipulations as to the salience of 
risk had little or no impact. 
Likewise, one might have expected that divergent cultural frames would 
have led subjects to become polarized after reading our balanced introductory 
material, as Kahan and colleagues have found.54 Our subjects reported an open-
mindedness to reform, while distinguishing between attractive reforms (such as 
moving to an opt-out system) and unattractive reforms (such as a regulated 
market), and also distinguishing within each reform between evaluations of 
morality and efficacy. Thus, we are not concerned that our human subjects were 
simply non-compliant or distracted. 
 
 50.  See James S. Fishkin, Robert Luskin & Roger Jowell, Deliberative Polling and Public 
Consultation, 53 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 657, 660 (2000). 
 51.  See generally JOHN HANSON, IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW (2012) (arguing that 
human decisions are driven more by situations than dispositions). 
 52. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 6. 
 53.  Cf. Kahan et al., Nanotechnology, supra note 7, at 87–88 (describing a “cultural predisposition 
toward risk”). 
 54.  Id. 
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We did find broad consensus among both Democrats and Republicans that 
a market for organs could be effective in increasing supply, but that it was 
deeply problematic from a moral point of view, causing a lack of support 
overall. Alternatively, the payment of vouchers for funeral expenses enjoyed 
broad support. It is surprising that the two methods of financial incentives had 
such different evaluations, though these differences might be due to the way 
that the proposals are described in our stimuli. Teasing apart concerns about 
efficacy from morality, the voucher program appeared to alleviate the deep 
moral objections to a market, while nonetheless maintaining perceived efficacy. 
Our study also suggests that a package of reforms, including reciprocal 
preferences, opt-out, and elimination of the family veto, might be politically 
feasible. This package of reforms likewise neutralizes moral objections to a 
reform of reciprocal preferences alone. 
Overall, it appears that once Americans are informed about the basic 
aspects of the cadaveric organ shortage and given a chance to reflect upon 
potential reforms in a balanced way, they are able to reach pragmatic and 
coherent conclusions favoring certain reforms. Scholars should seek to exploit 
whatever consensus does exist and press toward political and legal 
implementation of sensible reforms. We should not be paralyzed by bugaboo 
concerns of a polarized, paralyzed, and irrational electorate. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
A. Background Information Shown to All Subjects. 
Over 50 years ago, surgeons pioneered organ transplantation as a treatment 
for kidney failure. For many diseases – such as kidney, liver, heart, and lung 
failure – organ transplantation is now the best, and sometimes the only, 
treatment available for patients. In recent years, organ transplantation has 
become even more effective, because of advances in drugs and transplantation 
methods. Patients who receive transplanted organs are more likely to enjoy a 
full recovery and return to a normal way of life. 
However, in the United States, there has long been a shortage of organs for 
transplantation. Currently, there are over 115,000 people on waiting lists to 
receive organs, and these people must wait several months or years, depending 
on which organs they need. Over 5,000 people die each year while waiting for 
an organ for transplantation, while many others suffer while waiting for an 
available organ. 
It is possible, but very rare, to transplant some organs from living persons. 
Undergoing such a surgery is, however, dangerous. And most organs, such as 
hearts or lungs, are impossible to transplant from a live donor. Therefore, the 
vast majority of organs come from cadavers – the bodies of dead persons. These 
are called “cadaveric organs.” 
Most people die in ways that make it impossible to use their organs for 
transplantation. When a person dies in a way that leaves a healthy organ, it is 
necessary to make a decision about its use shortly after death. Otherwise, if 
there is too much of a delay, the organ degrades and becomes unusable for 
transplantation. When organs are removed, the surgical procedure is performed 
in a way that leaves the cadaver intact for whatever funeral arrangements may 
be preferred, including the possibility of an open-casket funeral. 
B. Writing Task Manipulations 
 
Need Condition Stimulus Taken Condition Stimulus 
Imagine that someone you love is 
suffering from progressive liver failure, 
due to a genetic disease known as 
hemochromatosis. The liver failure 
becomes fatal as it progresses, and your 
loved one needs an organ transplant or 
else he or she will eventually die. There is, 
however, a severe shortage of organs for 
transplantations. Your loved one waits on 
the list for several months. Unfortunately, 
the shortage is so severe that he or she is 
eventually informed that it will be 
impossible to find an available organ in 
time. Think deeply about how you would 
Imagine that someone you love feels very 
strongly that his or her body be buried in 
its entirety, and thus your loved one 
adamantly opposes that his or her organs 
be taken for transplantation. Nonetheless, 
imagine that your loved one dies suddenly 
in a car accident, and when taken to the 
hospital, the transplant team removes 
some of his or her organs for 
transplantation. It is not clear exactly how 
this happened – whether it was because 
the family authorized the transplantation, 
or because some local law allowed 
transplantation without consulting 
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feel, and what you would think, when 
learning that there is no organ available 
for your loved one and that, as a result, he 
or she will soon die. Write, in the space 
below, your thoughts about this sequence 
of events; try to think about and deeply 
feel, and then write with enough detail so 
that the reader will think and even feel the 
same way. 
[400-500 characters, please] 
anyone’s preferences, or just because of 
some miscommunication. Still, the 
transplanted organs were actually used to 
save the life of another person, a young 
woman who was suffering at a nearby 
hospital. Write, in the space below, your 
thoughts about this sequence of events; try 
to think about and deeply feel, and then 
write with enough detail so that the reader 
will think and even feel the same way. 
[400-500 characters, please] 
Note: The Control condition included no writing task. 
C. Proposed Policy-Reform Pairs  
Instructions 
Each country sets its own laws and policies about organ transplantation, and they have 
chosen different approaches. The following sections describe parts of the cadaveric 
organ transplantation policy used within the United States, as well as proposals for how 
to reform those parts in order to reduce the shortage of organs. Please carefully 
consider each of the parts and how they might remain the same or be reformed. You 
will later be asked to select which overall cadaveric organ transplantation policy you 
most prefer be used within the United States. You will do this by indicating, for each 
part, which position you most prefer. 
Opt-In vs. Opt-Out 
The United States currently uses an opt-in 
model: if a person wants to have his or her 
organs transplanted after death, then he or 
she must actively fill out paperwork 
signing up as a donor. If a person does not 
sign up as a donor, then his or her organs 
are usually not transplanted. Advocates of 
this system say that it embodies individual 
choice, because a person will not become a 
donor unless he or she actively decides to 
be one. Moreover, an emphasis on 
donation reflects the value of altruism 
(i.e., selflessly caring for others). 
 
One proposal would change to an opt-out 
system: organs will be transplanted from 
the bodies of dead persons, unless those 
individuals had expressed a desire not to 
provide their organs. Advocates say that 
this system is already in use by several 
other countries as a way to reduce the 
organ shortage, recognizing that many 
people just never make a decision either 
way. Polls show that most people would 
want to have their organs transplanted, 
and the opt-out system reflects their 
preferences. Individuals who feel strongly 
opposed to having their organs 
transplanted could register that preference 
instead by filling out paperwork. 
Family Choice vs. Personal Choice 
Regardless of whether a person signs up to 
donate his or her organs, hospital staff 
often ask any surviving members of the 
family whether to transplant the organ. 
Advocates for this family choice practice 
say that family members are in the best 
One proposal focuses on the deceased 
person’s choice instead. This proposal 
would change the law to prohibit hospital 
staff from asking surviving family 
members whether to transplant organs of 
the deceased person. Instead, hospital 
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position to know what the deceased 
person would have wanted, regardless of 
any donation paperwork he or she may 
have filled out long ago. Moreover, the 
family members are the ones who have to 
live with the consequences of the choice to 
donate or not. It is fitting that the 
survivors get the final decision. 
 
staff would rely only upon the registration 
status of the individual. Advocates of 
personal choice argue that family 
members should not be able to override 
the free choice of the deceased person. 
Moreover, the family members are likely 
to be very upset by their recent loss. The 
family may have clouded judgment and 
experience further discomfort if the 
hospital staff forces them to make this 
decision. 
Altruistic Donations vs. Regulated Market 
Federal law currently prohibits the buying 
or selling of organs. Instead donations are 
given on a volunteer basis without any 
financial compensation. Advocates of 
keeping this law argue that it is necessary 
to prevent sales of body parts, which 
would degrade human beings. In addition, 
organ sales could worsen inequality, 
because the poor might feel more of an 
economic pressure to sell their organs than 
the rich. A further worry is that a market 
for selling organs could actually “crowd 
out” those who are now willing to donate 
altruistically, and thus reduce the number 
of organs available for transplantation. 
One proposal would allow organs to be 
bought and sold in a regulated market, 
similar to how federal law currently allows 
payment for sperm, egg, blood serum, and 
bone marrow. The physicians and nurses 
that handle the transplant procedure are 
paid for their services, after all. Advocates 
of such a regulated market for organs 
argue that the current law prohibiting 
sales is a major cause of the shortage; we 
instead need to create an incentive that 
could increase the supply of organs. It is 
also fair to compensate people for their 
willingness to provide their organs, and 
fair to ask recipients of organs to pay for 
the benefit. 
 
Voluntarism Alone vs. Funeral Recognition 
Currently, in the United States, there is no 
official recognition or reward for persons 
who agree to have their organs 
transplanted after they die. 
Rather, donations are given on a 
volunteer basis. Advocates of keeping this 
law argue that it is necessary to reflect the 
value of pure altruism (i.e., selflessly 
caring for others). It would also be 
improper to cause people to make such an 
important decision on the basis of any 
other factor, which may cloud their 
judgment or degrade their human dignity. 
These advocates say that a system of 
voluntarism alone is best. 
 
One proposal would recognize organ 
donors by allowing health insurers to 
cover their funeral expenses. This voucher 
would be limited to the average cost of a 
funeral. This voucher would go to the 
families of deceased persons whose organs 
are transplanted. Advocates of the funeral 
voucher argue that it could increase 
donations by those planning for their own 
estates, and the voucher expense could 
come from the recipient’s health insurance 
coverage. Also, since the amount of the 
voucher would be limited and could only 
be spent on funeral expenses, it would not 
be degrading nor would it worsen 
inequality. 
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Open Eligibility vs. Reciprocal Preference
Presently, the systems for receiving and 
distributing cadaveric organs are 
completely separate. A patient is eligible 
to receive a transplanted organ even if he 
or she is not signed up as an organ donor 
himself or herself. Advocates of such open 
eligibility argue that allocation of organs 
should be based purely on medical 
criteria, and should not be made 
conditional on whether one has made the 
decision to become a donor. Moreover, 
the current policy preserves the value of 
altruism, because decisions to donate 
remain focused solely on helping another 
person, as opposed to receiving any 
personal benefit. 
One proposal is to give people who agreed 
to provide their own organs upon death 
priority access to the organ waiting list, if 
they someday need an organ 
transplantation. Advocates of such a 
“reciprocal preference” argue that during 
this time of shortage, it is fair to give 
organs to those persons who are 
themselves willing to contribute to the 
pool of organs. Those refusing to 
contribute do not deserve to take from the 
pool. This proposal could increase the 
number of contributors, and could also 
reduce demand for organs, by excluding 
those who refuse to contribute themselves. 
 
Finally, please consider a particular combination of some of the individual policy 
reforms discussed above. This combined proposal involves reciprocal preferences, an 
opt-out system, and personal choice, all in one package of reforms. To review these 
features:  
• First, the “reciprocal preferences” reform would give people who agreed to 
provide their own organs upon death priority access, if they someday need an 
organ transplantation. Thus, even while alive, one would receive a benefit from 
their willingness to share.  
• Second, under “opt-out” everyone would be in the organ system, with priority 
access to get organs and also registered to give organs upon death, unless they 
opted-out. Anyone would be free to opt-out from giving organs, thereby 
removing their priority access to receiving organs as well.  
• Third, under “personal choice,” the registration status of the individual would 
control whether their organs are removed. The surviving members of the family 
would not be asked. Now please indicate your preference for whether to stay in 
our current system (on the left) or change to this combination of reforms (on 
the right). For this purpose, please assume that this is the only potential reform 
on the table. 
 
Current Package 
Open Eligibility 
Opt-In 
Family Choice 
Reform Package
Reciprocal Preference
Opt-Out
Personal Choice 
 
D. Scale 
The bidirectional, anchored Likert-type scale that we used to collect data 
about efficacy, morality, and overall preferences is shown in figure 3. We 
converted the nonnumerical values to scores one through nine for analysis. 
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